Fordham Law Review
Volume 75

Issue 4

Article 2

2007

The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers
Amanda Frost

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1931 (2007).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A., Harvard College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Ken Anderson, Marty Lederman, Dan Marcus, Scott Moss, Herman
Schwartz, Stephen Vladeck, and David Zaring for their comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to
the faculty members at the American University Washington College of Law for their thoughtful
comments, and to the Dean for providing the summer research grant that supported the writing of this
Essay.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss4/2

ESSAY
THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Amanda Frost*
INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001, George W. Bush's Administration has
repeatedly asserted the state secrets privilege as grounds for the dismissal of
civil cases challenging the legality of its conduct in the war on terror.
Specifically, the executive has sought dismissal of all cases concerning two
different government programs: the "extraordinary rendition" program,
under which the executive removes suspected terrorists to foreign countries
for interrogation; and the National Security Agency's warrantless
wiretapping of communications by suspected terrorists. The executive
argues that these cases raise legal challenges that can neither be proven nor
defended against without disclosure of information that would jeopardize
national security, and thus it seeks to have all cases related to these
programs dismissed on the pleadings. The district courts have split on the
issue, and these cases appear to be quickly heading for appellate, and
possibly U.S. Supreme Court, review.1
The plaintiffs in these cases have responded to the executive's invocation
of the privilege with two primary counterarguments: First, they assert that
the cases must go forward to remedy past violations of their individual
constitutional rights and enjoin ongoing violations; and second, they argue
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A.,
Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Ken Anderson, Marty
Lederman, Dan Marcus, Scott Moss, Herman Schwartz, Stephen Vladeck, and David Zaring
for their comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the faculty members at the
American University Washington College of Law for their thoughtful comments, and to the
Dean for providing the summer research grant that supported the writing of this Essay.
1. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006)
(denying the government's motion to dismiss a challenge to the National Security Agency's
(NSA's) warrantless wiretapping program on state secrets grounds); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (same); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D.
Il1.2006) (granting the government's motion to dismiss a challenge to the NSA's warrantless
wiretapping program on state secrets grounds); Hepting v. AT&T, Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d
974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying the government's motion to dismiss a challenge to the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program on state secrets grounds); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp.
2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (granting the government's motion to dismiss legal claims arising
from extraordinary rendition on state secrets grounds).
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that requiring courts to dismiss all such cases in which the executive
broadly asserts the state secrets privilege is an unwarranted usurpation of
judicial power.2 Although these are legitimate grounds on which to oppose
the executive's motions to dismiss, this Essay raises a third objection that
has not been discussed by the litigants: the executive's incursion on
3
legislative authority to assign federal court jurisdiction.
The Constitution gives Congress near-plenary power to decide which
kinds of Article III cases and controversies federal courts shall hear,4 and
throughout most of this nation's history Congress has chosen to confer
jurisdiction over a wide variety of legal claims against the federal
government. 5 Accordingly, when the executive successfully argues that a
federal court must dismiss whole categories of cases over which Congress
has assigned jurisdiction, it intrudes not just on the power of courts and the
rights of individuals, but on the jurisdiction-conferring authority of the
legislature as well.

2. See infra Part I. Academic discussion of the privilege has also focused on its effect
on individual rights and judicial power. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, In the Name of National
Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case 258 (2006) ("Broad
deference by the courts to the executive branch, allowing an official to determine what
documents are privileged, undermines the judiciary's duty to assure fairness in the
courtroom and to decide what evidence may be introduced."); Robert M. Chesney, State
Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?
abstractid=946676 ("[T]he privilege has the capacity to prevent courts from engaging the
most significant constitutional issue underlying the post-9/11 legal debate: whether and to
what extent recognition of an armed conflict with al Queda permits the executive branch to
act at variance with the framework of laws that otherwise restrain its conduct."); William G.
Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 Pol. Sci. Q. 85, 90
(2005) ("[T]he privilege, as now construed, obstructs the constitutional duties of courts to
oversee executive action.").
3. Of course, the state secrets privilege is not the only method by which the executive
can seek to dismiss cases challenging executive conduct from a court's docket. In recent
litigation, the executive has raised many different grounds for dismissal of cases challenging
its conduct in the war on terror, including claims that the courts lack jurisdiction over such
cases. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762-70 (2006) (discussing the
executive's assertion that the Detainee Treatment Act stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantanamo Bay detainees). Academics
have also argued that the courts lack the institutional competence to oversee national security
and foreign policy, and thus should play a limited role in such cases. John Yoo, Courts at
War, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 573, 590-600 (2006). Although this Essay focuses on the
executive's assertion of the state secrets privilege, its conclusions would apply to the
executive's other grounds for seeking immediate dismissal of litigation challenging its
course of conduct in the war on terror.
4. See infra Part II; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 319-22, 330-45 (5th ed. 2003).
5. See Fallon, et al., supra note 4, at 35-36 (describing the Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31,
§ 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198, which provided for the removal of suits against federal officers from
state to federal courts, and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 552 (current version at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2000)), which gave the federal courts jurisdiction over all civil
cases "arising under" federal law and satisfying an amount-in-controversy requirement).
Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
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Furthermore, by seeking dismissal of these cases, the executive is
stripping Congress of its ability to collaborate with the judiciary to curb
executive power. The constitutional scheme of separated powers not only
permits one branch, acting on its own, to check the others; it also allows
two branches to work together to keep the third in line. 6 By giving federal
courts the authority to hear cases challenging the use of executive power,
Congress is enlisting the courts as its partner in executive oversight. When
the judicial branch is considering whether to dismiss cases challenging
executive action at the executive's behest, it should therefore be cognizant
that dismissal undermines the cooperation between courts and Congress,
and may leave the executive unchecked and unmonitored by any branch of
government.
The executive itself has recognized that Congress has a role to play in
these cases. In its motions to dismiss on state secrets grounds, the executive
has argued that Congress is the more appropriate institution to review the
constitutionality of executive action. For example, in ACLU v. NSA, 7 a case
challenging the National Security Agency's (NSA's) practice of warrantless
wiretapping, the government sought dismissal but noted, "This is not to say
there is no forum to air the weighty matters at issue, which remains a matter
of considerable public interest and debate, but that the resolution of these
issues must be left to the political branches of government."'8 The executive
appears to be suggesting that the court should dismiss the case because
Congress is capable of policing the executive on its own.
As a threshold matter, the executive's claim that the "political branches,"
and not the courts, must resolve the issues raised in the litigation ignores the
fact that one of the political branches-Congress--gave federal courts the
authority to hear suits against the executive for constitutional violations. In
other words, that the court has jurisdiction over the case is one political
branch's method of addressing the problem. Admittedly, however, that
logic only goes so far. Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction over
broad categories of cases, and it might agree with the executive that a
subcategory of those cases involving state secrets should be dismissed.
Maybe Congress would prefer that sensitive matters of national security be
resolved in another forum---closed-door congressional hearings, for
example-as the executive seems to suggest in its motions asserting the
privilege. If so, however, then it would seem that judges should not simply
dismiss these cases, but should instead insist on some proof that Congress
would approve and, just as important, would take over executive branch
oversight if the courts bow out.

6. See infra Part II.
7. 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
8. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United States' Assertion of
the Military and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and Defendants' Motion to Stay Consideration of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 49, ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (No. 10204)
[hereinafter Memorandum in Support of the Military and State Secrets Privilege].

1934

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

In this Essay, I explore why courts should be cognizant of the effect of a
dismissal on legislative, as well as judicial, power, and how courts should
respond to the executive's claims that these issues "must be left to the
political branches of government." My tentative conclusion is that when
the executive makes such claims, courts should not take its assertions at
face value, but rather should determine whether Congress would be willing
to assume the oversight function through investigation of executive action.
Judges should assure themselves that the executive is, in fact, acceding to
congressional demands for information about the challenged conduct, and is
fully cooperating with the legislative committees seeking to monitor its
conduct.
Only if satisfied that Congress is holding the executive
accountable should the judiciary be willing to forgo hearing whole
categories of cases challenging executive authority.
These proposed responses to the executive's blanket motions to dismiss
are grounded in a functional theory of separation of powers, and follow
from the widely accepted view that each branch's power fluctuates in
accord with the actions of the other two. Functionalists contend that there
are no bright lines demarcating the roles of the three branches; their powers
are shared, so that oftentimes one branch must obtain another's approval
before acting. In his iconic concurrence in the Steel Seizure case, Justice
Robert H. Jackson-the ultimate functionalist-explained that the
President's authority is greatest when he has the express approval of
Congress, and is at its "lowest ebb" when he acts contrary to a legislative
prohibition. 9 Under Jackson's conception of the separation of powers, the
roles of the three branches of government are not rigidly defined, but rather
are flexible, shifting to accommodate the positions taken by the others.' 0
The commingling of executive, legislative, and judicial power is usually
viewed as a means of limiting each branch's authority to take action. But
the three branches can also collaborate to prevent the overreaching of a
third. The same fluctuations observed by Justice Jackson in the context of
an executive power grab should apply when the branches are sharing the
burden of executive oversight. That is, the role of the judiciary in curbing
executive power should depend, in part, on whether Congress can do so in
the court's stead. If Congress is engaged in oversight, then the judiciary
may step aside; if, however, Congress is unable or unwilling to take on that
task, then the judiciary's role in checking executive power is paramount.
Accordingly, I suggest that the judiciary has an obligation to ascertain
Congress's willingness and ability to engage in executive oversight before
granting blanket dismissals of cases challenging the constitutionality of
executive conduct.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the
state secrets privilege and a brief description of the categories of cases that

9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J.,
concurring).
10. See infra Part II.
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the executive has recently claimed must be dismissed by federal courts on
the basis of that privilege. This part also discusses how the Bush
Administration's assertion of the privilege differs from past practice. Part
II explains why the judiciary should take into account the effect of
dismissal not just on its own constitutional role and on the plaintiff's ability
to vindicate his or her individual rights, but also on the legislative power to
assign jurisdiction and delegate executive oversight to the federal courts. I
contend that if courts fail to take the usurpation of legislative power into
account, they are overlooking a key component of the Constitution's
tripartite system of government: the ability of two branches to work
together to check the excesses of the third. Part III moves from these
observations to concrete suggestions about how courts should react to an
executive claim that all cases challenging the constitutionality of certain
executive programs should be dismissed and left for the "political
branches" to resolve. I propose that when the executive makes such a
blanket assertion of the privilege, the judiciary should not forgo the exercise
of jurisdiction unless it is satisfied that Congress will take over the task of
executive oversight.
Finally, a caveat. This is an essay in the original sense of the word, in
that it tests out theories and suggests solutions without providing exhaustive
background or addressing every objection or concern that could be raised.l'
Due to the limits of space and time, this Essay can only start a conversation
about how courts should respond to the executive's attempts to dismiss
cases on state secrets grounds. I hope to return to the ideas first raised here
in greater detail in articles to come, but it seems important to begin the
discussion now in light of the dozens of pending cases in which the
executive has invoked this privilege. In the meantime, I welcome others
who wish to join the conversation as either critics or proponents of the
tentative theories and proposals expressed in the pages that follow.
I. EXECUTIVE ASSERTION OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

A. History of the State Secrets Privilege
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that
derives from the President's authority over national security, and thus is
imbued with "constitutional overtones."' 12 It protects information that
11. One definition of "essay" is a "trial" or "test." Oxford English Dictionary 399 (2d
ed. 1989). The French word "essai," from which the modem English word "essay" is
derived, stems from the French verb "essayer," which means "to try." The French

renaissance philosopher Michel de Montaigne, credited with popularizing the essay as a
literary form, used his essays to test and explore his views about the world. See
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Essay, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9033044 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007).
12. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); see United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Memorandum in Support of the Military and State Secrets Privilege;

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 10 (arguing that the "privilege derives from
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would result in "impairment of the nation's defense capabilities, disclosure
of intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of
diplomatic relations with foreign governments."' 13 The privilege can only
be asserted by the head of an executive branch agency with control over
state secrets, and only after that person has filed an affidavit demonstrating
that he or she has personally reviewed the information at issue and
determined that it qualifies as state secrets. 14
1 1. United States v. Reynolds
The privilege was first explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Reynolds. 15 Reynolds involved a claim for damages against
the federal government brought by the widows of three civilians killed in
the crash of a B-29 aircraft. During discovery, plaintiffs sought production
of the U.S. Air Force's official accident investigation reports, as well as the
three surviving crew members' statements taken by the Air Force during its
investigation. The United States objected, claiming both that the material
was privileged under Air Force regulations and that it must be kept secret to
protect national security. The Secretary of the Air Force wrote a letter to
the district court explaining that "the aircraft in question, together with the
personnel on board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air
Force."' 16 The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force filed an affidavit
making a formal claim of privilege and stating that the material sought by
the plaintiffs could not be provided "without seriously hampering national
security, flying safety17 and the development of highly technical and secret
military equipment."'
The district court ordered the government to produce the documents in
camera so that the court could determine whether they contained privileged
material. When the government refused to do so, the court ordered that the
facts on the question of negligence be found in the plaintiffs' favor, and
entered final judgment for the plaintiffs. The government appealed, lost,
and then brought the case to the Supreme Court.
The United States argued that the district court's decision ordering
disclosure of the report constituted an "unwarranted interference with the
powers of the executive," which had the constitutional authority to refuse to
disclose information related to national security. 18 The plaintiffs responded
that the executive's power to withhold the documents was waived by the
the President's Article II powers to conduct foreign affairs and provide for the national
defense").
13. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038
(1984).
14. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8.
15. 345 U.S. 1. For an in-depth discussion of the Reynolds litigation, see Fisher, supra
note 2, at 29-118.
16. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Brief for the United States at *8, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378.
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Tort Claims Act, which made the government liable "in the same manner"
as a private individual. 19 The Supreme Court did not adopt either of the
"broad propositions" pressed upon it by the parties. 20 The Tort Claims Act
expressly provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to suits
against the United States, and because the Rules governing discovery
except "privileged" material from disclosure, the Court concluded that the
Tort Claims Act is not a waiver of the state secrets privilege. Nor did the
Court hold that the bare assertion of the privilege by the executive would be
sufficient to invoke it; rather, the "court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege" 2 1 by weighing the
discovery-seeking party's claim of necessity against the government's
22
explanation of why the information would jeopardize national security.
Nonetheless, as recent commentators have noted, the "clear message of the
Reynolds ruling is that courts are to show utmost deference to executive
assertions of privilege." 23 And in Reynolds itself, the Court accepted the
government's representations about the classified nature of the materials
24
and refused to require their disclosure.
The privilege affects litigation in at least three different ways. First, it
can bar evidence from admission in the litigation. The plaintiffs case will
then go forward without the barred evidence, and will be dismissed only if
the plaintiff is unable to prove the prima facie elements of the claim without
it. Second, if the privilege deprives the defendant of information that would
provide a valid defense, then the court may grant summary judgment for the
defendant. And third, "notwithstanding the plaintiff's ability to produce
nonprivileged evidence, if the 'very subject matter of the action' is a state
secret, then the court should dismiss the plaintiffs action based solely on
the invocation of the state secrets privilege. '2 5 In Reynolds, the Court took
the first path, concluding that the privilege only limited sources of evidence
and thus remanded to allow plaintiffs to take discovery and attempt to prove
their case without the barred material.

19. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 530.

20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 11.
23. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 98; see also Fisher, supra note 2, at 257 ("What
Reynolds did was to send an ominous signal that in matters of national security, the judiciary
is willing to fold its tent and join the executive branch."). Professors William Weaver and
Robert Pallitto note that the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the state secrets privilege in
Reynolds relied in part on analogies to the crown privilege found in English and Scottish
law. They criticize the Court for importing this privilege into U.S. law, noting that in Great
Britain, "separation of powers is ill-defined and occupies a relatively less important role in
the British Constitution than in that of the United States," and that Reynolds "fail[ed] to
recognize this difference." Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 99.
24. The accident report was eventually declassified and, according to Professor Louis
Fisher, "revealed... serious negligence by the government" but "contained nothing that
could be called state secrets." Fisher, supra note 2, at xi.
25. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S.
at 11 n.26).
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2. The Evolution of the State Secrets Privilege
For over two decades following Reynolds, the executive rarely asserted
the state secrets privilege, perhaps in response to the Supreme Court's
admonition that the privilege "is not to be lightly invoked. '26 But starting
in 1977, the executive raised the privilege with greater frequency. Between
1953 and 1976, there were only eleven reported cases addressing the
27
privilege; between 1977 and 2001 there were fifty-nine reported cases.
Scholars debate whether the Bush Administration's assertion of the state
secrets privilege differs from past practice. 28 Several contend that it does,
claiming that the executive is now raising the privilege with far greater
frequency and is using it to obtain outright dismissals rather than simply to
limit discovery. 2 9 A recent article by Professor Robert Chesney questions
these conclusions, however, and thus is worth further discussion.
Professor Chesney reviewed all the published cases in which the
executive has invoked the state secrets privilege since the Reynolds
decision. 30 He found that the privilege was asserted two times between
1961 and 1970, fourteen times between 1971 and 1980, twenty-three times
between 1981 and 1990, twenty-six times between 1991 and 2000, and

26. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
27. See Chesney, supranote 2, app. Professors Weaver and Pallitto report slightly lower
numbers for both those time periods. They claim that the privilege was asserted in four
reported cases between 1953 and 1976, and then in fifty-one reported cases between 1977
and 2001. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 101-02.
28. Compare Fisher, supra note 2, at 212, 245 (stating the privilege is being asserted
with greater frequency post-9/1 1), and Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 109 (concluding
that the executive is asserting the privilege with increasing frequency, and declaring that the
"Bush administration lawyers are using the privilege with offhanded abandon"), and
Shayana Kadidal, The State Secrets Privilege and Executive Misconduct, JURIST Forum,
May
30,
2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/state-secrets-privilege-andexecutive.php (asserting that "[p]revious invocations of the privilege by the government
have most commonly been at the discovery stage, asking the courts to deny private litigants
access to documents and witnesses, but more recently the government has moved to dismiss
a spate of cases ...at the pleading stage"), with Chesney, supra note 2, at 50-52 (surveying
the case law and concluding that the Bush Administration's assertion of the privilege is not
unprecedented in frequency, scope, or manner).
29. Fisher, supra note 2, at 212, 245; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 109; Kadidal,
supra note 28.
30. Chesney, supra note 2, app. As Professor Robert Chesney is careful to note, using
published decisions as the basis for determining the frequency of a particular
administration's assertion of the privilege is problematic. Id. at 52-54. The executive's
claims may often be decided in unpublished rulings that are not available for analysis.
Furthermore, cases decided during one administration might have arisen out of the assertion
of the privilege by a previous administration. And in any event the frequency of the
privilege's assertion might have more to do with the number of cases challenging executive
branch activity than a particular administration's policy regarding use of the privilege.
Despite these limitations, Professor Chesney analyzes these cases because they provide the
only data on the privilege, and because even with the aforementioned limitations they help to
guide discussion of patterns in executive assertion of the privilege. Id.
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twenty times between 2001 and 2006.31 He concluded that these numbers
"do[] not support the conclusion that the Bush Administration employs the
'32
privilege with greater frequency than prior administrations.
Professor Chesney also addressed the claim that the Bush Administration
is asserting the privilege in a qualitatively different manner than in the past.
Some commentators contend that the privilege was once used primarily to
restrict discovery, but is now being invoked as grounds for dismissal of
entire lawsuits. 33 Professor Chesney's analysis of the published cases
reveals that the executive sought outright dismissal based on the privilege in
five cases between 1971 and 1980, nine cases between 1981 and 1990,
thirteen cases between 1991 and 2000, and fifteen cases between 2001 and
2006. 34 Again, Professor Chesney determined that the data demonstrates
that the Bush Administration's use of the privilege is not unprecedented. 35
Professor Chesney's careful analysis of the case law has provided
valuable data with which to analyze claims about the state secrets privilege.
I disagree, however, with his conclusion that these numbers prove that the
Bush Administration's assertion of the privilege does not differ from that of
previous administrations. First, Professor Chesney's survey demonstrates
that from 2001 through 2006 both the number of invocations of the
privilege and the occasions on which the Administration sought to dismiss a
case in its entirety increased significantly. The Bush Administration has
raised the privilege in twenty-eight percent more cases per year than in the
previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two percent more cases
per year than in the previous decade.
The sample size is small, and it is hard to draw conclusions from
published decisions alone, for all the reasons noted by Professor Chesney. 36
But to the degree that the published cases provide any insight into the
policy of this Administration, they are consistent with the conclusion that it
has raised the privilege with greater frequency than ever before, and has
more often sought to remove cases entirely from judicial dockets.
Second, and of greater significance, the Bush Administration's recent
assertion of the privilege differs from past practice in that it is seeking
blanket dismissal of every case challenging the constitutionality of specific,
ongoing government programs. In comparison, the government responded

31. See id. In addition, the government informed the court in Conner v. AT&T that it

"intends to assert the military and state secrets privilege in all of the[] actions" pending
against the telephone company that allegedly provided the United States access to telephone
communications without a warrant, and would "seek their dismissal." No. CV F 06-0632,
2006 WL 1817094, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2006),
32. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 52.
33. See Kadidal, supra note 28.
34. As discussed in supra note 3 1, the government has stated that it will seek dismissal
on state secrets grounds of all the pending challenges to the NSA's warrantless wiretapping
program. Because there have not been published decisions on that issue in most of these
cases, they are not included in Professor Chesney's analysis.
35. See Chesney, supra note 2, at 52.
36. See supra note 30.
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to lawsuits brought in the 1970s and 1980s challenging its warrantless
surveillance programs by seeking to limit discovery, and only rarely filed
motions to dismiss the entire litigation. 37 The current practice is thus
unique.
I hasten to add, however, that the blanket assertion of the privilege
should not be viewed as concrete evidence of the current Administration's
overzealous use of the privilege; one would expect all cases challenging a
specific government program to raise the same privilege issues. It is fair to
say, nevertheless, that this Administration's invocation of the state secrets
privilege as grounds for dismissal of all cases challenging the NSA's
practice of warrantless wiretapping and the extraordinary rendition program
raises new concerns for the courts.
3. Totten v. United States
Although Reynolds marked the first explicit recognition of the state
secrets privilege by the Supreme Court, the privilege has roots in the
Court's 1875 decision in Totten v. United States.3 8 Because the Bush
Administration relies on Totten, as well as Reynolds, to support dismissal of
cases challenging its conduct, the case is summarized below.
Totten involved a contract dispute between a Union spy and President
Abraham Lincoln. The contract, which the parties entered into in July
1861, provided that the spy was to travel behind "rebel lines" and transmit
information about the Confederate Army to the President in return for
payment of $200 per month. The spy performed the tasks agreed upon, but
was reimbursed only for his expenses.
The Supreme Court concluded that although President Lincoln had the
authority to enter into the contract, no court could enforce it. The Court
explained that it could not permit a suit against the government to proceed
in which "the details of dealings with individuals and officers, might be
exposed, to the serious detriment of the public." 39 The Court then stated,
"[A]s a general principle.., public policy forbids the maintenance of any
suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and
' '40
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case.
The Totten bar was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Tenet v.
Doe,4 1 a case in which two former spies claimed that the government had
reneged on its agreement to provide lifetime support for them in the United
States in return for espionage services in their native country. Their

37. See Chesney, supra note 2, app.

38. 92 U.S. 105 (1875); see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 n.ll (1953) (citing
Totten, 92 U.S. at 107).
39. Totten, 92 U.S. at 106-07.
40. Id. at 107.
41. 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
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complaint alleged that the government had violated their equal protection
and due process rights by refusing to abide by the terms of their original
agreement. The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss
pursuant to Totten on the ground that Totten applied solely to breach of
contract claims, 4 2 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 43 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Totten bar precludes judicial review of any claim
based on a covert agreement to engage in espionage for the United States. 4 4
B. The State Secrets PrivilegePost-September 11
In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the executive began
taking new steps to combat terrorism. The media has recently reported on
two controversial executive practices that have subsequently been
challenged in court: the extraordinary rendition program, under which the
United States transfers foreigners suspected of having ties to terrorist
organizations to foreign countries that practice torture;4 5 and the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program, under which the NSA eavesdropped on
telephone conversations involving suspected terrorists without first
46
obtaining a warrant.
Lawsuits have been filed challenging the constitutionality of both
programs by plaintiffs seeking damages and injunctive relief. In response,
the executive has invoked the state secrets privilege, not just as grounds for
dismissing some claims, but as a basis for having all litigation challenging
these two programs dismissed with prejudice prior to discovery. As of
December 31, 2006, six district courts have issued decisions in these
categories of cases and have split on the question whether to dismiss on
state secrets grounds. 4 7 The cases appear fast-tracked for appeal to the
federal courts of appeals and may end up before the Supreme Court.
42. See Doe v. Tenet, No. C99-1597L, 2001 WL 35925897 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2001).
43. See Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).
44. See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 3.
45. Nina Bernstein, U.S. Defends Detention at Airports, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2005, at
B1; Don Van Natta, Jr., Germany Weighs if it Played Role in Seizure by U.S., N.Y. Times,
Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.
46. James Risen & Erich Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. On January 17, 2007, the Bush Administration announced that
it would submit its domestic surveillance program to supervision by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. See Adam Liptak, The White House as a Moving Legal Target, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al. The effect of this change in conduct on the pending cases is
unclear. The Administration has argued that these cases are now moot, but plaintiffs contend
that the executive's voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct does not moot their
litigation. See Adam Liptak, Judges Weigh Arguments in U.S. Eavesdropping Case, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 2007, at All (describing the arguments by the government and the ACLU
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the government's appeal from the
district court's decision inACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006)).
47. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006)
(rejecting the government's claim that the challenge to the NSA's warrantless wiretapping
program should be dismissed on state secrets grounds); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp.
2d 899 (N.D. Il. 2006) (dismissing a challenge to the NSA's warrantless wiretapping
program on state secrets grounds); Hepting v. AT&T, Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
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This Essay will not recount in detail all the recent litigation in this area
because the government makes almost identical arguments regarding the
need for dismissal in each of the extraordinary rendition and NSA
warrantless wiretapping cases. Summarized below are a few cases in each
category to give the reader a sense of the underlying controversy, the
positions taken by the United States and the litigants, and the courts'
responses.
1. Challenges to the Extraordinary Rendition Program
48
a. El-Masri v. Tenet

Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, asserted that on
New Year's Eve 2003 he was seized by Macedonian authorities while
crossing the border between Serbia and Macedonia. El-Masri alleges that
he was imprisoned in a Skopje hotel for twenty-three days, where he was
repeatedly questioned about his associations with al Queda by U.S.
officials. Despite his denials of any involvement with al Queda, El-Masri
contends that the U.S. government then flew him to Kabul, Afghanistan,
where he remained until May 28, 2004, when he was taken to an abandoned
road in Albania and released.
El-Masri filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia alleging that he was transported against his will to Afghanistan
as part of the United States' "extraordinary rendition" program, and that he
was repeatedly interrogated, drugged, and tortured throughout his ordeal.
He named as defendants the former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), George Tenet; private corporations allegedly involved in the
program; and unknown employees of the CIA and private corporations who
participated in his alleged abduction and torture. El-Masri asserted three
causes of action. First, he brought a Bivens claim against Tenet and
unknown CIA agents for violations of his Fifth Amendment right not to be
deprived of his liberty without due process and not to be subject to
treatment that "shocks the conscience." 49 Second, he brought a claim
pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international legal norms
prohibiting prolonged, arbitrary detention. Third, he brought a claim
pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute for each defendant's violation of
international legal norms prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.
2006) (rejecting the government's claim that the challenge to the NSA's warrantless
wiretapping program should be dismissed on state secrets grounds); A CLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754 (same); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing legal claims
arising from extraordinary rendition on state secrets grounds); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414
F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing legal claims arising from extraordinary

rendition without reaching the government's state secrets claim).
48. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
49. Id. at 534-35.
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On March 8, 2006, the United States filed a formal claim of state secrets
privilege, supported by an unclassified and a classified (and ex parte)
declaration by the Director of the CIA. Five days later, the United States
filed a motion to intervene to protect its interests in preserving state secrets,
and a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that
maintenance of the suit would inevitably require disclosure of state
secrets. 50 The government asserted that "the plaintiff's claim in this case
plainly seeks to place at issue alleged clandestine foreign intelligence
activity that may neither be confirmed nor denied in the broader national
interest," but could not give more details about the potential damage
because "even stating precisely the harm that may result from further
proceedings in this case is contrary to the national interest. '51 In addition to
seeking dismissal on state secret grounds, the executive argued that the case
should be dismissed pursuant to the Totten bar.
U.S. District Judge T. S. Ellis granted the government's motion to
dismiss. Judge Ellis commented that the state secrets privilege is of "the
highest dignity and significance" in light of the "vitally important purposes"
it serves. 52 Although Judge Ellis noted that the "courts must not blindly
accept the Executive Branch's assertion [of the privilege], but must instead
independently and carefully determine whether, in the circumstances, the
claimed secrets deserve the protection of the privilege," he qualified this
statement by commenting that "courts must also bear in mind the Executive
Branch's preeminent authority over military and diplomatic matters and its
greater expertise relative to the judicial branch in predicting the effect of a
particular disclosure on national security. ' 53 He also wrote that the
privilege is absolute-that is, once a court determined that the privilege had
been validly asserted, it applies no matter how great the opposing interests
at stake.
Judge Ellis then concluded that the privilege applied to the information
sought by El-Masri. The Director of the CIA's unclassified declaration
spoke in general terms about the harm to national security that might result
were the government forced to admit or deny El-Masri's allegations.
Although the Judge could not reveal the contents of the ex parte declaration,
he stated that "any admission or denial of [E1-Masri's] allegations by
defendants in this case would reveal the means and methods employed
pursuant to this clandestine program and such a revelation would present a
grave risk of injury to national security." 54 Despite the government's
public admission that the extraordinary rendition program exists, Judge
Ellis concluded that this general information did not render the details of
50. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion by Intervenor

United States to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 11, El-Masri,437
F. Supp. 2d 530 (No. 01417).

51. Id. at 11-12.
52. El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536.

53. Id.
54. Id.
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the program as it may have been applied to El-Masri less worthy of being
kept classified.
Finally, Judge Ellis dismissed the case after concluding that the
privileged material is "central" to the claims and defenses raised in the
litigation. 55 He explained that although
"dismissal is appropriate only when no amount of effort and care on the
part of the court and the parties will safeguard privileged material," it is
equally well-settled that "where the very question on which the case turns
is itself a state secret, or the circumstances make clear that sensitive
military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that
any attempt to proceed will threaten 56disclosure of the privileged matters,
dismissal is the appropriate remedy."
El-Masri's lawsuit must be dismissed, the Judge explained, because any
response to his claims of abduction, detention, and torture as part of the
United States' extraordinary rendition program would inevitably reveal
"specific details" about that program. 57 Moreover, Judge Ellis concluded
that protective procedures, such as providing defense counsel with
clearance to review classified documents, would be "plainly ineffective"
because the "entire aim of the suit is to prove the existence of state
secrets." 58 Accordingly, "El-Masri's private interests must give way to the
national interest in preserving state secrets. '59
In a concluding paragraph, Judge Ellis took pains to emphasize that
"reasonable and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the
propriety and efficacy of [the extraordinary rendition program]"--it is just
that they may not be able to bring such claims before a court. 60 The district
court also noted that if El-Masri's claims were true, then El-Masri "deserves
a remedy." 6 1 The "sources of that remedy," however, "must be the
Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch. '6 2
On July 25, 2006, El-Masri's lawyers announced that they had filed an
63
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

55. Id. at 538.
56. Id. (quoting Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 539.
59. Id. The district court did not address the United States' alternative argument that the
case was nonjusticiable pursuant to the "Totten bar." Id. at 540.
60. Id. at 540.
61. Id. at 541.
62. Id.
63. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Appeals Case of German Man Kidnapped by CIA
(July 25, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/26219prs
20060725.html.
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64
b. Arar v. Ashcroft

Maher Arar's claims parallel those raised by Khaled El-Masri. Like ElMasri, Arar alleges that he was abducted, detained, and then sent to another
country where he was tortured as part of the United States' extraordinary
rendition program. Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, was employed as
a software engineer in Massachusetts. In September 2002, Arar alleged that
he was detained by U.S. authorities at John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York City while flying back from Switzerland, and that he
was kept in solitary confinement there for thirteen days. On October 1,
2002, Arar was told by government officials that he could not be admitted
back into the United States because they believed that he was a member of
al Queda. Although Arar was assured that he would not be sent back to his
native Syria, nine days later he alleged that he was flown by private jet to
Amman, Jordan, where federal officials delivered him to Jordanian
officials, who in turn brought him to Syria. In Syria, Arar contends that he
was imprisoned for a year in a small jail cell where he was beaten and
tortured by Syrian security forces. He claims that his Syrian interrogators
worked with U.S. officials, who provided information and questions and
received reports from the Syrians about Arar's responses. Arar was
released on October 5, 2003. No charges were ever filed against him.
Arar filed suit in the Eastern District of New York claiming that his
removal from the United States violated his Fifth Amendment rights, as
well as the Torture Victims Protection Act and other treaties.
Prior to discovery, the government moved for dismissal or summary
judgment on state secrets grounds of the three claims concerning the U.S.
government's deportation of Arar to Syria and his interrogation and torture
while there. 6 5 The executive's arguments were similar to those made in ElMasri's case: The very subject matter of the case concerned the details of a
program that was secret, and needed to be kept that way for national
security reasons. The government's reasons for detaining Arar, concluding
that he was a member of al Queda, and then sending him to Syria rather
than to Canada cannot be disclosed, the government argued, without
jeopardizing national security. Because information at the "core" of Arar's
first three claims is a state secret, the government concluded that these
claims must be dismissed.
The district court issued a decision on February 16, 2006, dismissing all
of Arar's claims. The court held that Arar lacked standing to bring claims
for declaratory relief against the plaintiffs in their official capacities; that
the Torture Victim Protection Act does not provide him with a cause of
action; and that he could not bring a Bivens action "given the national64. 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).

65. The government did not seek dismissal of Maher Arar's fourth claim on state secrets
grounds. That claim concerned his alleged mistreatment while detained in the United States.
The United States and the individual defendants sought to dismiss that claim on other
grounds.
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security and foreign policy considerations at stake."'6 6 Because the court
dismissed Arar's claims on other grounds, it did not address the executive's
67
claim that the case should also be dismissed on state secrets grounds.
Arar's lawyers have filed an appeal to the Second Circuit.
2. Challenges to the NSA's Warrantless Wiretapping Program
68
a. Hepting v. AT&T Corp.

In Hepting v. AT&T Corp., filed in the Northern District of California,
plaintiffs alleged that AT&T is collaborating with the NSA to conduct a
warrantless surveillance program that illegally eavesdrops on the
communications of millions of Americans. The existence of the program
was publicly acknowledged by the President in December 2005 after an
article describing the warrantless wiretapping appeared in The New York
Times. As the President explained at a press conference on December 19,
he authorized the NSA to intercept communications for which there were
"reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the communication originated or
terminated outside the United States, and (2) a party to such communication
is a member of al Qaeda, a member of a group affiliated with al Qaeda, or
an agent of al Qaeda or its affiliates." 69 The complaint contends that
AT&T, acting as an agent of the U.S. government, has violated the First and
Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens, as well as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and various other state and federal
laws. The plaintiffs seek certification of a class action and damages,
restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive and declaratory relief.70
On May 13, 2006, the United States sought to intervene and moved for
dismissal or summary judgment on the basis of the state secrets privilege. 7 1
Its assertion of the privilege was supported by public declarations from
John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, and Keith Alexander,
Director of the NSA. The government also invited the court to review
classified information supporting the privilege in camera and ex parte,
72
which the court eventually did.
The government argued that the case should be dismissed on the basis of
the state secrets privilege for three reasons: first, because the "very subject
matter of [the action]" concerns privileged information; second, because the
66. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
67. Id.
68. 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

69. United States' Reply in Support of the Assertion of the Military and State Secrets
Privilege and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment By the
United States at 1, Hepting,439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No. 0672), 2006 WL 2038464 (citing Press

Release,

Press

Conference

of

the

President

(Dec.

19,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html).
70. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
71. Id.
72. Id.

2005),

available at
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plaintiffs could not make their prima facie case without the privileged
information; and third, because the absence of the privileged information
would deprive AT&T of a defense. 73 In addition, because the case
concerned a covert agreement between AT&T and the government, the
United States contended that it qualified for dismissal under Totten v.
United States.
District Court Judge Vaughn Walker denied the government's motion on
July 20, 2006. The court began by describing the information publicly
available about the NSA terrorist surveillance program. Judge Walker
noted that the NSA surveillance program had been reported in the press and
confirmed by President Bush. When questioned about its involvement in
the program, AT&T had refused to confirm or deny existence of the
program, but stated that "when the government asks for our help in
protecting national security, and the request is within the law, we will
provide that assistance. ' 74 Based on this information, the court concluded
that AT&T's involvement in the program was not covert, but rather was
public information, and thus the case should not be dismissed under the
75
Totten bar.
Turning to the state secrets privilege, the court noted as a threshold
matter that "no case dismissed because its 'very subject matter' was a state
secret involved ongoing, widespread violations of individual constitutional
rights," as were alleged here, but instead most cases concerned "classified
details about either a highly technical invention or a covert espionage
relationship. ' 76 In addition, the court stated that the "very subject matter of
this action is hardly a secret" because "public disclosures by the
government and AT&T indicate that AT&T is assisting the government to
implement some kind of surveillance program." 7 7 For this reason, Judge
Walker concluded that the case was distinguishable from El-Masri v. Tenet,
where the entire purpose of the lawsuit was to reveal classified details
78
regarding the extraordinary rendition program.
Judge Walker declared that it was "premature" to decide whether the case
should be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs could not make out a
prima facie case or AT&T could not assert a valid defense. 79 Instead, Judge
Walker determined that he should let discovery proceed and then assess
whether any information withheld pursuant to the state secrets privilege
would require the suit's dismissal.

73. Id. at 985.
74. Id. at 992.
75. Id. at 993 ("In sum, the government has disclosed the general contours of the
'terrorist surveillance program,' which requires the assistance of a telecommunications
provider, and AT&T claims that it lawfully and dutifully assists the government in classified
matters when asked.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 994.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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In conclusion, Judge Walker commented that he viewed the state secrets
privilege as limited, at least in part, by the role of the court in the
constitutional structure:
[I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its limits.
While the court recognizes and respects the executive's constitutional
duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also takes seriously its
constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come before it.... To
defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy here would be to abdicate that
duty ....

80

Judge Walker certified his denial of the government's motion to dismiss for
interlocutory appeal because "the state secrets issues resolved herein
represent controlling questions of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for difference of opinion." 8 1 The government immediately
82
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for interlocutory review.
83
b. American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency

In ACLU v. NSA, a group of journalists, academics, attorneys, and
nonprofit organizations challenge the same warrantless surveillance
program at issue in Hepting. The plaintiffs communicate with individuals
from the Middle East whom the government might suspect of being
affiliated with al Queda, and thus they believe that their telephone calls and
internet communications would fall within the scope of the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program. They contend that even the possibility
that the government is eavesdropping on their calls has a chilling effect on
their communications and thus disrupts their ability to talk to clients,
84
sources, witnesses, and generally engage in advocacy and scholarship.
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal court in the Eastern District of
Michigan challenging the surveillance program as a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine, their First and Fourth Amendment rights,
and FISA and other federal laws. They sought declaratory and injunctive
relief that would prevent the NSA from eavesdropping on domestic
communication without a warrant.
The United States filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment
very similar to that filed in Hepting. Although the executive conceded that
the "issues before the Court" regarding the constitutionality of the NSA's
surveillance program "are obviously significant and of considerable public
interest," 85 it contended that these questions cannot be explored in litigation

80. Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1011.
82. Petition by Intervenor United States for Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C.
1292(b), Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No. 672).
83. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
84. Complaint at 2, ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d (No. 10204).
85. Memorandum in Support of the Military and State Secrets Privilege, supra note 8, at
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because the evidence supporting the government's program qualifies for the
state secrets privilege, as well as specific statutory privileges. 86 In a public
and in camera declaration submitted by John Negroponte, Director of
National Intelligence, and a public and in camera declaration of Major
General Richard J. Quirk, Signals Intelligence Director, National Security
Agency, the executive formally asserted the state secrets privilege to
prevent disclosure of "intelligence activities, information, sources, and
methods" relevant to the litigation. 87 Without this evidence, the executive
claimed that plaintiffs could neither establish standing to sue nor prove the
merits of their claims. Because the "very subject matter" of the lawsuit is a
state secret, the executive asserted that the litigation must be dismissed, or
alternatively,
the court should grant the defendants' motion for summary
88
judgment.
The plaintiffs responded that statements already in the public record
acknowledging the existence of the NSA's surveillance program were
sufficient to determine their standing and the lawfulness of the program.
The government, however, strongly disagreed: "[T]o decide this case on
the scant record offered by Plaintiffs, and to consider the extraordinary
measure of enjoining the intelligence tools authorized by the President to
detect a foreign terrorist threat on that record, would be profoundly
inappropriate. '89 The government argued that the President's exercise of
his "core Article II and statutory powers to protect the Nation from attack"
90
cannot be resolved on the basis of the public record alone.
On August 17, 2006, U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor issued an
opinion rejecting the government's claim that the case should be dismissed
on state secrets ground, and finding the NSA's warrantless wiretapping
program to be unconstitutional. 9 1 The government's attempt to have the
case dismissed prior to discovery suggested to Judge Taylor that the
government was arguing that the case was not justiciable under the Totten
doctrine. Judge Taylor concluded, however, that the Totten bar was not
applicable because the case did not concern an "espionage relationship
between the Plaintiff and the Government," as had been the case92in Totten
and in the most recent application of that doctrine in Tenet v. Doe.
Following the lead of Judge Walker, Judge Taylor reviewed the aspects
of the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program that had been publicly
admitted by the Administration, and the defense of that program that the
Administration had articulated thus far. She concluded that the plaintiffs'
challenge to the program could be resolved based on the government's onthe-record statements, and that neither the plaintiffs nor the government
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1952)).
Id. at 3.
Id.

91. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

92. Id. at 763.
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needed to discuss details of the program to pursue the litigation. For those
reasons, Judge Taylor denied the government's motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, and went on to address the merits of the constitutional
and statutory challenges to the NSA warrantless wiretapping program.
The government has filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit.
c. PretrialConsolidation of Challenges to NSA Warrantless Wiretapping
As of August 2006, several dozen lawsuits have been filed challenging
the NSA's practice of wiretapping without first obtaining warrants. On
August 9, 2006, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that
seventeen of the most closely-related cases be consolidated for pretrial
motions before Judge Walker, who had already ruled in Hepting that the
state secrets privilege does not apply. 93 The panel concluded that the
Northern District of California is the "appropriate transferee forum"
because it is the district "where the first filed and significantly more
advanced action is pending before a judge already well versed in the issues
presented by the litigation. '94 It rejected the government's request to have
the cases transferred to the District of Columbia because that would require
"the very duplication and expansion of access to classified information that
the Government deems to be so perilous. '95
As a result of this consolidation, the state secrets privilege issue should
be resolved quickly in those seventeen cases, and that decision will likely
be followed by immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit and possibly the U.S.
Supreme Court.
II. CONGRESSIONAL CONFERRAL OF JURISDICTION AS A MEANS OF

EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT

As described in the previous section, the Bush Administration has
asserted the state secrets privilege to seek immediate dismissal of all cases
challenging the constitutionality of two specific government programs.
Commentators dispute whether the Bush Administration is raising the
privilege with greater frequency than before, and whether its use of the
privilege to obtain dismissals rather than discovery relief differs from past
practice. 9 6 What is undebatable, however, is that the privilege is currently
being invoked as grounds for dismissal of entire categories of cases
challenging the constitutionality of government action. The executive's
concurrent claim that these cases are nonjusticiable under the Totten bar is
further evidence that, as one commentator put it, "the administration is now
well on its way to transforming [the state secrets privilege] from a narrow
93. In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (J.P.M.L. 2006). The
court stated in a footnote that twenty-six potentially related actions would be "treated as
potential tag-along actions in accordance with Panel and local court rules." Id. at 1334 n. 1.
94. Id. at 1335.

95. Id.
96. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary privilege into something that looks like a doctrine of broad
97
government immunity."
Conceptualizing the state secrets privilege as an attempt to deprive courts
of subject matter jurisdiction over cases challenging the constitutionality of
certain executive practices raises new concerns--concerns that differ from
those articulated by the litigants. The plaintiffs in these cases have warned
that dismissal will prevent injured parties from vindicating their
constitutional rights, and will strip the courts of their authority to remedy
such violations in individual cases. These objections are certainly valid,
and have been cited by some courts as reasons to avoid using the privilege
as a basis for dismissal prediscovery. 9 8 Absent thus far is a discussion of
whether dismissals on state secrets grounds diminishes the power of
Congress in our constitutional structure, perhaps because concern for
Congress's authority only becomes clear when the privilege is recognized
as equivalent to an executive attempt to narrow federal jurisdiction.
A. FirstPrinciples: CongressionalControl over FederalJurisdictionas a
Means of Executive Oversight
1. Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction
Congress exercises near plenary control over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Granted, Congress must do so within constitutional
confines: Congress can only assign to federal courts cases falling under the
nine subject matter headings in Section 2 of Article III, and there are some
limits on Congress's ability to strip all federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
certain kinds of constitutional claims. 99 But within these parameters
Congress has sweeping authority to craft federal jurisdiction through
legislation. 100
Congress's authority over federal jurisdiction arises logically from its
control over the very existence of the lower federal courts. The framers
97. Henry
Lanman,
Secret
http://www.slate.com/id/2142155/.

Guarding,

Slate,

May

22,

2006,

98. See supra Part I.

99. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the JudiciaryAct of 1789,
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III,
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in

the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633 (1990); Louise Weinberg, The
Article III Box: The Power of "Congress " to Attack the "Jurisdiction" of "FederalCourts,"

78 Tex. L. Rev. 1405 (2000).
100. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) ("'[T]he judicial power of
the United States ...is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this Court)
dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely
upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to
the Supreme Court) ...and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."' (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 236, 244 (1845))).
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disagreed over the need for the "inferior" courts. Under a compromise
negotiated by James Madison, they agreed to give Congress the choice
whether to create lower federal courts, and, as part and parcel of that
compromise, the authority to decide which cases those courts could hear.
Thus, every time a lower federal court hears a case, it does so at Congress's
pleasure. 101
The existence of the Supreme Court, unlike the lower federal courts, is
constitutionally mandated, but Congress retains a great deal of control over
the jurisdiction of the nation's highest court as well. Article III provides
that the "Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." Although Congress's power to strip the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction is also not absolute, 10 2 Congress has significant
latitude to shape Supreme Court jurisdiction in the course of crafting
"exceptions" to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 10 3
2. Legislative and Judicial Collaboration in Executive Oversight
Congress's extensive control over federal jurisdiction has important
ramifications. First, it bolsters the democratic legitimacy of judicial
decision making. Because courts are counter-majoritarian institutions, their
decisions are in some tension with a democratic system of government.
Indeed, the federal courts are insulated from politics precisely so that they
can serve as a check on the tyranny of the majority. Nonetheless, our
constitutional structure provides the judiciary with second-order democratic
legitimacy by giving the political branches the power not just to select and
impeach judges, but also to determine which cases they will hear. When an
unelected federal judge issues a decision that affects thousands or millions
of Americans, his authority to do so comes in part104from the grant of
jurisdiction bestowed by elected members of Congress.
Second, Congress's power to confer jurisdiction permits Congress to
work together with courts to police the activities of the executive branch.
Once Congress passes a statute it is then the duty of the executive branch to
"faithfully execute" the law. 10 5 Although Congress has no formal role in
implementing statutes, it has several indirect methods of checking the
executive's performance of that function. For example, Congress can

101. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 3.3 (4th ed. 2003).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 98, § 3.2.
103. See Chemerinsky, supra note 101, § 3.2.
104. See, e.g., David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Processas
Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2508 (1998)
("Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of federal courts finds solid support in the text
of the Constitution, and plays an important structural role in legitimating the courts'
antidemocratic decisions: the very fact that Congress could limit the federal courts'
jurisdiction, but has not, affords the courts' decisions a degree of political legitimacy.").
105. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
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reduce or increase funding for the executive's favored programs, and it can
hold oversight hearings at which executive branch officials must explain
themselves. In addition, Congress can grant federal courts jurisdiction to
hear cases challenging the executive's implementation of the law, or
claiming that executive action exceeds statutory or constitutional limits.
This last method of executive oversight differs from the others in that
Congress is not acting on its 06own, but rather is delegating executive
oversight to the judicial branch. 1
Congress has good reasons to utilize the courts to assist it in overseeing
the executive branch. Allowing courts to hear such cases keeps Congress
and the executive from clashing directly. A lawsuit challenging executive
action will be brought by a private citizen, and the decision will be made by
a court and not Congress. Furthermore, because courts are somewhat
insulated from political pressures, judicial decisions regarding the
constitutionality of executive action may be more acceptable to a public
suspicious of the President's or Congress's motives-particularly when the
executive and legislative branches are controlled by opposing parties.
Courts also have the advantage of hearing challenges to executive conduct
in the context of a concrete injury suffered by the plaintiff, whereas
Congress's inquiries may be more abstract and general. The judicial
process, with its many fact-finding mechanisms and opportunities to be
heard, is perhaps the better way to resolve some of these debates. Finally,
members of Congress are burdened with many responsibilities-the
primary one being to enact legislation-and thus they do not have the time
to devote to executive oversight. By creating federal jurisdiction over cases
challenging executive action, Congress has enlisted approximately 900
10 7
federal judges to assist it in this task.
The ability of two branches to coordinate oversight of the third is an
often overlooked aspect of our tripartite system of government, and yet it
serves an important role in the system of checks and balances established
by the Constitution. The formalist view of separation of powers requires
that each branch perform its assigned tasks with rigid independence from

106. Theoretically, Congress could provide for resolution of cases challenging executive
conduct in state courts alone. Many of the same observations stated here would continue to
apply were Congress to select the state rather than federal judiciary to be its partner in
federal oversight. However, there are some limits on state courts' authority to compel
federal officials to take action. See McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821)
(holding that a state court lacked the power to issue a mandamus to a federal executive
official); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) (holding that a state court lacked
power to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a federal prisoner). These restrictions suggest that
Congress has conferred broad federal question jurisdiction on federal courts (and provided
for removal of federal question cases from state to federal courts) because federal courts are
the more appropriate and able partner to curb executive overreaching. See 28 U.S.C §§ 1441,
1442 (2000).
107. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 102 ("In recognition of its limited capacities
of oversight, Congress facilitates executive accountability by transferring much of its
oversight function to the judiciary.").
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the others. 108 The dominant functionalist theory is more flexible, conceding
that the branches may engage in activities outside of their narrow,
constitutionally assigned tasks, but only so long as they do not diminish the
constitutional stature of another branch by taking over its essential
functions. 10 9 The latter view, in the words of Justice Jackson in the Steel
Seizure case, "contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."" 10 When Congress drafts the
courts to assist in executive oversight, it is drawing upon the flexibility of
the constitutional structure to keep the executive in line.
B. Applying FirstPrinciplesto the Executive's Assertion of the State
Secrets Privilege
1. Judicial Discretion to Exercise Jurisdiction
The litigants and courts addressing the state secrets privilege have
viewed it as an evidentiary restriction, and not as the executive's attempt to
carve out a set of cases from the jurisdiction conferred on the courts by
Congress. Yet the executive is using the privilege to seek dismissal of
every case challenging the constitutionality of the extraordinary rendition
and warrantless wiretapping programs. The end result is the same as if the
executive branch told the courts that cases challenging the constitutionality
of this set of executive actions are beyond the judiciary's power to hear and
decide.
The executive's assertion of the privilege thus undermines Congress's
authority to assign federal jurisdiction and simultaneously to enlist the
courts as its partner in executive oversight. When a litigant claims that the
executive has violated a statute or engaged in unconstitutional conduct-as
is alleged in the challenges to both the warrantless wiretapping and
extraordinary rendition programs-courts serve as a check on the potential
abuse of executive authority. They do so because Congress gave the federal
judiciary the authority to hear cases in which executive power is challenged
by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants courts broad federal question

108. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1513, 1530 (1991).
109. See id. at 1530 (describing "the scholarly debate about separated powers" as
"polarized, for the most part, between the formalists and the functionalists-a battle between
those who would pay the price of rigidity in order to achieve an elusive determinacy on the
one hand, and those who would pay the price of indeterminacy in order to achieve unguided
flexibility on the other").
110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also The Federalist No. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Edward
Mead Earle ed., 1937). The framers sought to prevent any one branch from aggrandizing
power by "so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places." Id.
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jurisdiction, and by enacting specific statutory limits on executive power in
the area of national security, such as in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. If the judiciary agrees with the executive branch that it
must dismiss these cases to protect state secrets, it is abdicating its
congressionally assigned task to restrain executive power.
For this reason, the executive's assertion of the state secrets privilege in
the cases outlined in Part I cannot be equated with the use of the privilege in
either Reynolds or Totten. In the latter two cases, the plaintiffs were
seeking damages for negligence and breach of contract, respectively; they
made no claims that the executive had overstepped its constitutional
authority. Although the Totten bar was recently affirmed in Tenet v. Doe,
in which the plaintiffs did allege that their constitutional rights were
violated by the government's failure to adhere to the terms of their contract,
Tenet did not involve any ongoing executive branch program or practice
and the dispute was limited to the parties before the Court. The executive's
assertion of the privilege in all of these cases was not part of a broad pattern
under which it raised the privilege to bar any case of this type from being
heard in court. Certainly, Reynolds, Totten, and Tenet all involved legal
claims that Congress had granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear and
decide. But the judicial role in these cases was to determine whether an
individual deserved a remedy, and not to act as Congress's deputy in
curbing ongoing abuse of executive power.
In its post-9/1 1 assertions of the state secrets privilege, the executive
branch acknowledges that it is seeking to eliminate judicial oversight of
some executive programs, but contends that the legality of executive action
is better addressed by the "political branches" and not the courts.11 1 That
argument overlooks the primary role that Congress-one of the "political
branches"-plays in granting federal courts jurisdiction in the first instance.
Indeed, for the reasons described above, the "political branch" solution to
the problem might well be to permit courts to determine the legality of such
executive conduct.
Admittedly, Congress's decision to grant federal courts jurisdiction over
cases challenging executive authority does not require courts to ignore
executive claims of privilege and hear cases that jeopardize national
security. Congress provides federal jurisdiction over large categories of
cases, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331's broad grant of jurisdiction over cases
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
When faced with a specific case that would force disclosure of information
vital to national security, and perhaps for little benefit, Congress might well
prefer that courts decline jurisdiction. (Although its enactment of statutes
limiting executive power in the area of national security suggests
otherwise.) Furthermore, courts have long asserted that they have some
discretion about whether to hear cases that Congress has assigned to them,
and have often chosen to abstain or defer to some other political institution
111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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rather than reach out and decide a matter that is technically within their
purview."12 Thus, simply because courts have authority to hear cases
challenging executive action does not mean that they are constitutionally
required to do so. It does suggest, however, that courts should examine
more closely the role that the federal judiciary and Congress play in
working together to check executive authority before granting executive
demands to dismiss these cases.
2. Congressional Reliance on the Courts to Police the Executive's "War on
Terror"
Congress has been criticized for failing to enact legislation that would
clarify the legality of executive action in the war on terror, and for leaving
these hard questions for the courts to struggle with alone."1 3 For example,
the Senate Judiciary Committee was accused of ducking responsibility for
its proposal to send questions about the constitutionality of the warrantless
surveillance program to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 114 and
Congress failed to pass any legislation in response to that controversial
executive practice. During three years of contentious litigation over the
legality of detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Congress remained silent while
the executive branch, detainees, and courts struggled with the question
whether the detentions were permitted by the Authorized Use of Military
Force Act, which was passed shortly after September 11, 2001. After
judicial prodding, 115 Congress did enact legislation expressly addressing the
treatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees, first in the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 and then in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, but it has left
most aspects of the executive's war on terror untouched. In short,
Congress's supervision of the executive branch's conduct in the war on

112. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985)
(describing when courts may appropriately refuse to hear cases over which they have
jurisdiction).
113. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, It's Congress's War, Too, N.Y. Times, Sep. 3, 2006, §
6 (Magazine), at 20 (arguing that Congress can no longer avoid legislating in the fight
against global terrorism). For a more detailed discussion of Professor Kenneth Anderson's
views, see Kenneth Anderson, Law and Terror, Pol'y Rev., Oct.-Nov. 2006, at 3.
114. Eric Lichtblau, Administration and Critics, in Senate Testimony, Clash Over
EavesdroppingCompromise, N.Y. Times, July 27, 2006, at A2 1.
115. The Supreme Court repeatedly invited Congress to enact legislation addressing the
rights of Guantanomo Bay detainees. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004) ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."); see
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress
has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind
at issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary.").
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terror has been far from comprehensive, and has often relied on judicial
6
review as the backstop for aggressive assertions of executive power."
Congress's deliberate use of the courts as a check on abuse of executive
power should be a factor in the court's analysis of the state secrets privilege.
Courts should always be cautious when faced with executive assertion of
the privilege, but they should be especially reluctant to dismiss entire
categories of challenges to executive actions that Congress intended them to
hear. By declining to hear these cases, courts are not just diminishing their
own role in the constitutional structure, they are eliminating a
constitutionally prescribed method through which Congress can curb the
executive.
Of course, Congress could check the executive almost entirely on its
own, without judicial assistance. Congress can hold hearings at which it
closely questions executive officers about their actions and demands an
accounting of executive conduct. Congress can enact laws prohibiting
some types of executive action, although it may have to do so over an
executive veto. In the most extreme circumstances, Congress can seek to
impeach the President for acting extra-constitutionally. These alternative
methods of checking the executive are not without costs for Congress,
however. They set up an unmediated showdown between these two
powerful branches of government, and lead to the kind of infighting and
partisan wrangling that has been demonstrated to alienate the public.
Perhaps for these reasons, Congress has been slow to enact legislation to
address the war on terror despite repeated calls for it to do so. Instead,
Congress has turned to the courts, heightening the judicial obligation to
entertain legal challenges to executive conduct.
111. PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE: SUGGESTED JUDICIAL RESPONSES
TO THE EXECUTIVE'S ASSERTION OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE

Part II sought to establish a few basic propositions. First, that the
executive's invocation of the state secrets privilege as grounds for
dismissing certain categories of cases is akin to claiming that courts lack
jurisdiction to hear these cases. Second, by doing so, the executive
diminishes not just judicial power, but congressional power as well,
because Congress normally controls federal jurisdiction. And third,
Congress's grant of federal jurisdiction over claims challenging the legality
of executive action has added significance as a congressional-judicial
collaboration intended to prevent the executive from overreaching. This

116. Senator Arlen Specter, who voted for the Military Commissions Act, has stated that
he believed (and hoped) that the courts would hold significant aspects of those laws to be
unconstitutional. See Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, New Yorker, Dec. 4, 2006, at
46 (describing Senator Specter's belief that the "courts will invalidate" the provision of the
Military Commissions Act that strips the federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions filed by detainees in U.S. custody).
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part discusses how these conclusions should shape judicial analysis of the
executive's efforts to obtain blanket dismissals on state secrets grounds.
A. Courts Should be Especially Reluctant to Dismiss When the Executive Is
Seeking to PreventJudicialReview ofAll ConstitutionalChallenges to
Specific Executive Programs
Courts should be particularly hesitant to forgo jurisdiction when the
executive is seeking an across-the-board dismissal of all cases challenging
particular executive branch programs, because such claims implicate
Congress's constitutional authority, as well as the courts'. Congress has
delegated part of its executive oversight function to the judiciary, and thus
courts should not be as quick to leave the field as they might be were that
checking function not at issue. In short, judges should adopt a more holistic
view in such cases by taking into account the effect that blanket dismissals
will have on the relationship between the three branches of government.
Courts need not ignore executive concerns, however. There are many
steps short of outright dismissal that judges can adopt to protect state
secrets from public disclosure. Courts should attempt to respond to the
executive's claim of privilege by narrowing discovery, providing for
discovery under seal, or modifying plaintiffs claims-all steps that have
been taken by courts in previous cases.1 1 7 At the very least, judges should
allow discovery to proceed in some fashion before deciding whether the
"very subject matter" of the case requires its dismissal. A case may still be
able to go forward without requiring the executive to disclose details of
programs designed to protect national security.
B. An Alternative to OutrightDismissal: TransferringExecutive Oversight
Back to Congress
If, however, a judge is genuinely convinced that state secrets are
implicated by the subject matter of a lawsuit to a degree that requires its
dismissal, then she might consider transferring the task of curbing executive
power back to Congress.
Legal scholars have written extensively on judicial discretion to accept or
reject jurisdiction. Some claim that courts have very little leeway to refuse
to hear a case over which the Constitution and Congress grant it subject
matter jurisdiction,1 18 while others assert that courts have historically had
some latitude to accept or reject jurisdiction, and should continue to
exercise this discretion within reasonable boundaries. 119 Although the latter
view is more widely accepted, no one contends that courts are free to pick
and choose their caseload.

117. See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 86.
118. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
JudicialFunction, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984).
119. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 110.
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When a court exercises its discretion to forgo jurisdiction, it sometimes
justifies doing so on the ground that another arm of government is better
situated to address the matter. So, for example, a court may abstain when
faced with an unclear state law that appears to transgress constitutional
boundaries, but only after sending a question about the meaning of state law
to the state court (or by directing the parties to bring their litigation before a
state tribunal). 120 When a court engages in this type of abstention-referred
to as Pullman abstention after the first case in which the Supreme Court
advocated this course of conduct-it is not abandoning the field and leaving
the litigants without recourse for their constitutional claim. Rather, the
court is suggesting to the parties that there is a more appropriate institution
to address the problem in the first instance-the state courts, which are
more familiar with state law and will perhaps construe that law in ways that
prevent a court from ever having to reach the constitutional problem. The
Chevron deference that courts routinely grant to agencies' interpretation of
their governing statutes provides another significant example of the
abdication of judicial power to a political institution that is better suited to
12 1
resolve the issue.
Similarly, if a court concludes that the state secrets privilege applies such
that the dispute is not appropriately resolved in a judicial forum, it should
consider sending the legal question to a more suitable decision makernamely, Congress. Congress has the power to curb the executive through
oversight hearings, the enactment of new laws reining in executive action,
the withdrawal of funds, and impeachment. If a court is not the proper
institution to delve into the constitutionality of executive conduct because
its inquiry would jeopardize national security, then Congress can take over
that task. Moreover, because Congress was responsible for assigning
jurisdiction to the court in the first instance, it makes sense to return to
Congress with a dispute that a court has decided is not fit for judicial
2
review.

12

Admittedly, transferring oversight from the courts back to Congress is
logistically complicated and, some might argue, constitutionally suspect. If
Congress is already investigating the executive conduct in question,
however, a judge need not do anything more than stay the case and await
further developments-an act of restraint that is surely constitutionally
permissible. But if Congress has not yet given the issue its attention, the
court would have to seek Congress's involvement by instructing the
executive branch officials in the case before it to bring the issue to

120. See Fallon et al., supra note 4, at 1186-1213.
121. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
122. Cf Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev.

(forthcoming
2007)
(manuscript
at
45-52),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=896794
(discussing
Congress's
institutional superiority over courts in resolving questions about the meaning of truly
ambiguous statutes).
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Congress's intention, or even by contacting Congress itself and requesting
that it take over executive oversight. Whichever course of action the court
took to gain Congress's attention, it could then stay the case without
removing it from its docket while awaiting a congressional response.
Such direct judicial interaction with Congress concededly comes close to
the constitutional line that separates judging from legislating. Yet even
though this type of congressional-judicial interaction is atypical, it is not
unprecedented. Judges on occasion issue opinions asking Congress to fix a
poorly drafted statute, and at least one appellate panel sent its opinion to the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees in the hope of inspiring Congress
to amend the legislation at issue in the case. 123 Furthermore, the
executive's claim that courts must dismiss all cases challenging the legality
of specific government programs is also remarkable, and thus merits a
similarly unusual judicial response.
Of course, the executive branch may object to sharing information
concerning national security with members of Congress, just as it does to
providing that information to judges and plaintiffs. But most Presidents
have accepted (albeit reluctantly) that they need to keep Congress informed
about executive branch programs and policies regarding national security,
and they instruct their staffs to give at least some information about
ongoing programs and policies to Congress. The President's staff regularly
briefs members of the House and Senate Defense Committees in closeddoor sessions, where they provide these committees' members with
classified information that124the executive branch would not similarly share
with a plaintiff or a judge.
Moreover, members of Congress can demand that the executive keep
relevant committees informed about national security programs.
For
example, the National Security Act requires the executive to submit written
reports to congressional intelligence committees, and these committees
regularly seek information about intelligence gathering and national
security issues from the executive.
The current President contends,
however, that he has inherent constitutional authority to withhold classified
information under some circumstances. President Bush has stated that he

123. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2624 (2005)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may contain an "unintentional drafting gap" but concluding
that "[i]f that is the case, it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 603-04 (1995) (Ginsburg,

J., dissenting) ("If adjustment [of the statute] is in order, as the Court's opinion powerfully
suggests it is, Congress is equipped to undertake the alteration." (footnote omitted)); Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 '(1990) ("If Congress erred, however, it is for that
body, and not this Court, to correct its mistake."); Abdul-Malik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d

72, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that circuit courts have disagreed over the meaning of federal
sentencing statutes and directing the Clerk of the Court to forward the opinion to the Chairs
and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees). For a more detailed
discussion of the method by which courts and Congress communicate during pending cases,
see infra Part III.B.
124. See P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Federal Information Manual 102-04 (2006).
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would construe the National Security Act's disclosure requirement "in a
manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to withhold
information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, [or] the
national security."' 125 Congress has responded to such statements by noting
that, like the executive, Congress has the constitutionally assigned
responsibility to safeguard the nation, and it is empowered to declare war
and establish and fund intelligence gathering. 126 Although the issue is a
contentious one, the executive has rarely held out against sustained
congressional efforts to obtain information about the executive's national
security activities.
But what should the judiciary do if the executive was able to obstruct
congressional investigations? A court could inquire into the degree of the
executive's cooperation with Congress by asking the executive to disclose
to the court whether it has provided the information asked of it by
Congress, and whether Congress is satisfied with its level of cooperation.
The plaintiffs counsel might also give his or her views about the quality of
congressional oversight. And members of Congress on the relevant
oversight committees might choose to inform the court as to whether they
are satisfied with the executive's response. The court could then weigh this
case entirely or,
information when considering whether to dismiss the 27
alternatively, lift the stay and continue with the litigation. 1
These proposed judicial communications with the other branches are not
a threat to the separation of powers. Judges could only request, not
demand, that Congress take up the task of executive oversight and that the
executive cooperate with a congressional investigation; the other two
branches are free to ignore judicial efforts to transfer executive oversight
125. Press Release, White House, President Signs Intelligence Authorization Act (Dec.
28, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011228-3.html.
126. See Disclosure of Classified Information to Congress: Hearings Before the Select

Comm. on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 105th Cong. 5 (1998) (statement by Sen. Richard
C. Shelby) ("The issue before us is whether the Congress and the President share
constitutional authority over the regulation of classified information. As one might expect,
the Administration has asserted that the President has ultimate and unimpeded authority over
the collection, retention, and dissemination of national security information. We disagree.
While the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the authority to
regulate classified information, this grant of authority is by no means exclusive."); see also
Chesney, supra note 2, at 61 (stating that the executive must provide some information
relating to national defense and diplomacy to Congress, but noting that "the line between
that which [the executive] may [withhold from Congress] and that which it may not is
notoriously disputed").
127. Congress could also insist that the judicial branch hear these cases despite executive
assertions of the state secrets privilege. The state secrets privilege has been described as
consisting of a "potentially-inalterable constitutional core surrounded by a revisable common
law shell." See Chesney, supra note 2, at 61. Accordingly, Congress could legislatively
override the privilege but provide additional procedural protections to safeguard information
related to national security. For example, as Professor Chesney suggests, Congress could
require that such cases be heard in a classified forum akin to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. See id. at 63; see also Halpem v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1958) (ordering that the courtroom be closed to the public in order to protect national
security).
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back to Congress. Moreover, these admittedly exceptional judicial referrals
to Congress are justified by the executive's extraordinary demand that
courts relinquish their statutory and constitutional obligation to hear
challenges to executive action. Finally, the Bush Administration has
suggested to the courts that the legality of its conduct in the war on terror
should be resolved by the "political branches," which comes close to
inviting congressional involvement in these pending cases. Under such
circumstances, the judiciary is justified in bringing Congress's attention to
the matter rather than simply dismissing a case Congress intended it to hear.
C. The JudicialResponse Should Congress FailEffectively to Oversee the
Executive
Concededly, judicial efforts to focus Congress's attention on the dispute
may fail. Congress may choose not to do much in the way of oversight,
trusting that the executive is acting within constitutional limits and
unwilling to push for detailed information about programs that concern
national security. Or Congress may attempt to examine executive conduct,
only to be stymied by the executive's refusal to cooperate. If Congress
appears unwilling or unable to inquire into the legality of executive
conduct, however, then the judiciary's obligation to review that conduct is
all the stronger.
Despite the rhetoric found in many judicial decisions-most notably
Marbury v. Madison' 28-our system of government cannot guarantee a
remedy for every constitutional violation. As Professors Richard Fallon
and Daniel Meltzer have written, competing values and practical
considerations prevent courts from granting a full and complete relief for
the abrogation of constitutional rights in certain circumstances. 129 Yet even
though our constitutional structure tolerates the occasional unredressed
injury, it nonetheless "demands a system of constitutional remedies
adequate to keep government generally within the bounds of law."' 130 Thus,
the executive's assertion of the state secrets privilege in an individual
personal injury case-such as United States v. Reynolds-calls for a
different judicial response than the blanket assertion of the same privilege
to prevent judicial review of entire categories of executive conduct. In
Reynolds, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs' ability to obtain
compensation for possible government negligence must be sacrificed to
128. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury ....The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
129. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1778 (1991) ("[W]e begin by locating
Marbury's assertion in its historical and institutional context, within which the principle of a
remedy for every rights violation cannot plausibly claim status as an unyielding
imperative.").
130. Id. at 1778-79.
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prevent the release of a document that could jeopardize national security.
That calculus should come out differently when the executive is seeking to
remove all of the constitutionally-provided checks on its conduct.
For these reasons, when litigants challenge an executive branch program
on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of executive power, courts should
hesitate to abandon the field unless Congress is willing to step in. I propose
this as a general principle, however, and not an ironclad rule. In some rare
circumstances, when the nation is under grave threat of imminent and widescale attack, the executive should be given more latitude, at least for a time,
without having to explain itself. But when the executive is engaged in
constitutionally questionable conduct that lasts for a period of years, and
occurs during a time when the nation's populace is relatively safe, our
constitutional structure demands that it be subject to oversight from either
the courts or Congress.
CONCLUSION

When the executive seeks dismissal of a case on state secrets grounds,
the judiciary usually reacts as if it has a binary choice: to dismiss the case,
or to continue to hear it. But even if a court agrees with the executive that
the subject matter of a case raises questions that cannot be answered
without disclosing state secrets, the court should not assume that dismissal
is its only option. There is an alternative: The judge could issue a stay and
inform the parties that she will continue to abstain only if she is convinced
that Congress will take back the oversight role that it delegated to the courts
when it granted jurisdiction over cases challenging the legality of executive
action.
Indeed, this Essay posits that when the executive attempts to dismiss all
challenges to specific executive branch programs, courts have an obligation
not to abandon the field without first attempting to delegate the oversight
function back to Congress. The benefit of this approach is that it defers to
the executive's view that a private citizen's lawsuit should not be allowed
to jeopardize national security, and it takes courts out of the untenable
position of demanding disclosure of information that the executive contends
would endanger the nation. Furthermore, it accepts the executive's claim
that the issues at the heart of the litigation should be resolved by the
political branches of government, not the courts. Yet it does so without
permitting the executive to evade the oversight our tripartite system of
government generally requires. Although the judiciary need not be the
institution performing the checking function, it is vital that some institution
does.
The principle at work here is loosely related to Justice Jackson's classic
articulation of the relationship between the three branches in the Steel
Seizure case. Justice Jackson declared, "When the President takes measures
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at
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its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
13 1
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."'
Conversely, the President's power is at its broadest when he acts with
Congress's imprimatur, and falls somewhere between those two poles when
Congress is silent on the matter.
This Essay's proposal-that courts should first determine whether
Congress is willing and able to engage in executive oversight before
dismissing entire categories of cases challenging executive conduct-is
rooted in the same constitutional structure of checks and balances that
inspired Justice Jackson's three-tiered view of executive power. The three
branches not only share power, they also share a responsibility to curb the
excesses of the others. To keep this delicate balance, a court should
consider whether Congress can perform that task before it bows out, and
should be more reluctant to do so if Congress cannot, or if the executive is
obstructing congressional oversight. In other words, courts should not give
up their constitutional role as a check on the executive unless another
branch that shares that role is able to take over.

131. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).

